VIETNAM AT THE CROSSROADS : MARKET ECONOMY UNDER STATE CONTROL

This article analyzes the economic reform process, known as "Doi Moi" (Renovation), underway in Vietnam, placing the country at a critical crossroads. It examines the motivations behind the shift away from a centrally planned economy towards a "socialist-oriented market economy." The study details the key components of the reforms, including the de-collectivization of agriculture, the liberalization of prices, and the opening of the country to foreign trade and investment. The research explores the central dilemma of the Vietnamese model: the attempt to harness the dynamism of the market while maintaining the political monopoly of the Communist Party and a significant degree of state control over the economy. The paper assesses the early successes of Doi Moi in stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty. It concludes by analyzing the long-term challenges of this hybrid model, particularly the inherent contradictions between economic liberalization and the lack of corresponding political reform.

In 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam launched its ambitious reform program, "Doi Moi," a policy that would fundamentally transform the country's economy and society. This paper provides an analysis of Vietnam at this crucial crossroads. The study begins by outlining the dire economic crisis of the mid-1980s that made these radical reforms a necessity. The core of the article is an examination of the defining feature of the Vietnamese model: the attempt to create a market economy under the firm guidance and control of the socialist state. It details the key reform measures, such as the recognition of private enterprise and the promulgation of a liberal foreign investment law, which unleashed a wave of economic dynamism. The paper then delves into the profound dilemmas and contradictions inherent in this model. It explores the challenges of reforming the inefficient state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, which remained a major drag on the economy. Most critically, it analyzes the fundamental tension between the logic of the market, which requires decentralization and autonomy, and the logic of the Leninist state, which demands central control and a monopoly on power. The findings suggest that while Doi Moi had been remarkably successful in its initial phase in stabilizing the economy and generating growth, the long-term sustainability of this model was uncertain. The paper concludes that Vietnam's journey would be defined by its ongoing struggle to manage the complex and often contradictory relationship between the market and the state.