AFGHANISTAN CRISIS; SIGNS OF HOPE

This article assesses the state of the Afghanistan crisis in early 1987, a pivotal moment marked by new diplomatic initiatives and a shifting military balance. It analyzes the impact of the Soviet Union's leadership change under Mikhail Gorbachev and the nascent signs of a policy shift towards a political settlement and troop withdrawal. The study examines the UN-sponsored proximity talks in Geneva and the key sticking points that remained, particularly the timeline for a Soviet withdrawal and the nature of a post-withdrawal government. The research also evaluates the position of the Afghan Mujahideen and their international backers, including Pakistan and the United States, and their response to the emerging signs of Soviet flexibility. The paper argues that despite the ongoing brutal conflict, several diplomatic and political developments were creating the first genuine "signs of hope" for a negotiated end to the war. The analysis concludes by outlining the significant obstacles that still needed to be overcome to translate these hopes into a lasting peace.

After years of brutal conflict and diplomatic stalemate, 1987 brought the first credible "signs of hope" for a resolution to the Afghanistan crisis. This paper provides an analysis of the key developments during this period that signaled a potential turning point in the war. The central focus is the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. The study examines Gorbachev's public statements and the shift in the Soviet negotiating posture at the UN-mediated talks in Geneva, interpreting these as the first serious indications that Moscow was seeking an exit strategy. The paper details the progress made in the Geneva negotiations on several key instruments of a potential peace accord, while also highlighting the remaining, and most difficult, issues: the timeline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the formation of a transitional government acceptable to all Afghan factions. The analysis then shifts to the perspectives of the Mujahideen and their main supporters. It explores their deep-seated distrust of Soviet intentions and their insistence that a complete and unconditional withdrawal must precede any political settlement. The paper also discusses the role of the United States and its policy of supplying advanced weaponry to the resistance, a factor that both increased the military pressure on Moscow and complicated the path to a diplomatic solution. The findings suggest that while a peaceful settlement was by no means guaranteed, the confluence of Soviet policy changes and sustained international pressure had created a new and unprecedented window of opportunity for peace.