ARTICLE 70 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BANGLADESH: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION

This article provides a critical analysis of Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, the controversial "anti-floor-crossing" provision, and examines its implications for the process of democratization in the country. It explains the content of Article 70, which effectively prevents members of parliament from voting against their own party. The study explores the historical context and the stated rationale for this provision, which was to prevent political instability and "horse-trading." However, the research then provides a powerful critique, arguing that Article 70 has had a profoundly negative impact on the functioning of parliamentary democracy. The paper posits that it has stifled internal party democracy, transformed MPs into rubber stamps for their party leadership, and rendered the parliament ineffective as a forum for genuine debate and accountability. The analysis concludes that the reform or abolition of Article 70 is a critical and necessary step for the consolidation of a more meaningful and participatory democracy in Bangladesh.

Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh is one of the most debated and controversial provisions in the country's legal and political history. This paper provides a detailed examination of its implications for the process of democratization. The study begins with a textual analysis of the article and a review of its historical origins, noting that it was designed to prevent the kind of political instability that had plagued the country in its early years. The core of the article is a powerful critique of the unintended, and deeply anti-democratic, consequences of this provision. It argues that Article 70 effectively nullifies the representative function of a Member of Parliament, making them accountable not to their constituents but solely to their party leader. The paper details how this has led to a complete suppression of dissent within parliamentary parties and has made the parliament a weak and ineffective institution, with most substantive debate happening outside, in the streets. The findings suggest that Article 70 is a primary cause of the extreme centralization of power within the hands of the party chiefs and is a major obstacle to the development of a healthy intra-party democracy. The paper concludes by reviewing the arguments for and against its reform, making a strong case that for Bangladesh's parliament to become a truly sovereign and deliberative body, this constitutional shackle on the freedom of its members must be removed or significantly amended.