EMERGING STRATEGIC TRENDS IN SOUTH ASIA

Surveying the strategic landscape of South Asia in the early post–Cold War period, this article analyzes nuclear developments, conventional force balances and evolving maritime geographies. It argues that opaque deterrence, ballistic missile testing and dual-use technologies complicate crisis stability, while internal insurgencies and counterinsurgency doctrines create diversionary pressures. The paper evaluates modernization programs, logistics and C4ISR gaps, and the role of external suppliers. A maritime section considers sea-lane security, chokepoint exposure and the growth of naval aviation. The analysis emphasizes confidence-building measures—notification regimes, test preannouncements, hotline upgrades—and the need for professional military dialogue insulated from political volatility. It concludes that strategic prudence, transparency and regional standard-setting are essential to prevent accidents and escalation.

The body begins with a review of nuclear postures and second-strike debates, exploring opacity’s benefits and risks. It evaluates command-and-control arrangements, survivability and the organizational learning required to manage new technologies. A section on conventional forces compares order-of-battle, readiness and logistics depth, highlighting modernization asymmetries and terrain-driven operational art. Internal security dynamics are assessed through case studies of insurgency, force rotation and civil-military coordination. The maritime chapter analyzes fleet composition, anti-submarine warfare challenges and the strategic value of ports and island territories for power projection and trade resilience. Crisis management tools are catalogued: structured dialogues, military-to-military contact, third-party facilitation and rules of behavior at sea. The conclusion proposes a practical agenda—transparency on doctrines, risk-reduction centers, joint SAR exercises and regional incident-at-sea agreements—to sustain deterrence while lowering the probability of miscalculation.