STATE AND FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL ABSTRACTION

This article surveys core theoretical approaches that connect the modern state to the conduct of foreign policy. It contrasts systemic explanations that privilege polarity and distribution of capabilities with unit-level frameworks emphasizing regime type, leadership psychology and bureaucratic politics. A key contribution is to show how these perspectives can be combined through “two-level” models that track international constraints alongside domestic coalitions and institutional veto points. The discussion revisits classic debates on rational choice, bounded rationality and organizational routines, and explains why states sometimes pursue preferences that appear suboptimal in narrow material terms. It highlights agenda-setting by small policy communities, the role of ideas and identity in defining interests, and how state capacity conditions policy implementation. By mapping the complementarities and limits of each lens, the article offers a synthetic abstraction that helps scholars and practitioners interpret divergent national responses to similar external shocks.

The body begins by decomposing the state into three analytical layers: executive leadership, bureaucratic apparatus and societal coalitions. It shows how preferences originate, are filtered through institutions and become actionable policy. The systemic section examines balance-of-power logics and security dilemmas, using late–Cold War arms control as a case where structure narrowed options yet did not determine outcomes. A domestic politics section explores selectorate incentives, media effects and interest-group mobilization, illustrating how trade and human-rights lobbies reframed policy menus. The bureaucratic politics section details standard operating procedures, inter-agency bargaining and path dependence that privilege incrementalism over grand redesign. Cognitive factors are assessed through heuristics and misperception, explaining crisis escalation and signaling failures. The synthesis proposes a nested model: systemic context defines constraints; institutions distribute vetoes; ideas shape preference ranking; and capacity determines execution quality. The conclusion outlines research implications and policy diagnostics that help analysts anticipate when states will deviate from purely materialist predictions and why coordinated reforms can realign external behavior with articulated national strategies.