INDIA AND THE GULF CRISIS

This article analyzes New Delhi’s policy during the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, when Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait forced difficult choices on non-aligned states. It examines how India weighed normative commitments to sovereignty against practical imperatives tied to energy security, remittance flows from its Gulf diaspora, and the need to preserve working relations with all major powers. The study reconstructs decision points around UN resolutions, air and sea evacuations of citizens, and the calibration of diplomatic signaling toward Baghdad, Washington and regional capitals. It highlights bureaucratic coordination across external affairs, petroleum and civil aviation ministries, and explores the domestic political debate in parliament and the press concerning non-alignment’s meaning in a changing international order. The central claim is that India pursued a cautious, interest-driven neutrality that prioritized citizen protection and macroeconomic stability while avoiding reputational costs associated with overt alignment. The article concludes by drawing lessons for crisis management where energy dependence and overseas communities create powerful policy constraints.

The body proceeds in four parts. First, it situates the crisis in India’s late-Cold War environment: a balance-of-payments squeeze, heavy oil import dependence, and a doctrine of non-alignment under stress as superpower rivalry thawed. Second, it details operational responses—consular surge capacity, coordination with carriers and naval assets, and the large-scale evacuation that became a template for later contingencies. The analysis evaluates inter-ministerial frictions, procurement bottlenecks, and information gaps, showing how ad hoc mechanisms matured into standing playbooks. Third, it assesses diplomacy at the UN and in key capitals. India supported collective security in principle while avoiding rhetorical excess that could imperil access to Iraqi oil credits or Gulf labor markets. Elite interviews and parliamentary debates reveal competing narratives: moral universalism versus prudential realism. Fourth, the paper considers economic transmission channels—oil price shocks, insurance premia, and remittance volatility—and the macro stabilization steps taken to cushion the blow. The conclusion argues that India’s stance reflected a pragmatic reading of vulnerability: protect citizens first, keep energy flowing, maintain bridges with all sides, and preserve room for maneuver in an evolving post-Cold War order. It closes by outlining policy design features—scenario planning, diaspora registries, and diversified energy contracts—that later improved India’s crisis resilience.