AUTHORITARIANISM AND PROSPECT FOR DEMOCRACY IN MYANMAR

This article examines Myanmar’s authoritarian entrenchment after the 1988 uprising and the contested 1990 election, asking whether incremental reforms could produce a credible democratic opening. It analyzes the coercive and organizational capacities of the Tatmadaw, the legal architecture of emergency decrees, and the mechanisms used to control associational life, media and universities. The paper assesses the opposition’s resource base, trans-border activism and diaspora media, along with the constraints imposed by arrests, party deregistration and territorial conflicts with ethnic armed organizations. It explores regional diplomacy within ASEAN’s emerging “constructive engagement” framework and the limited leverage of sanctions. Conceptually, the article distinguishes liberalization from democratization and shows how regimes deploy partial relaxations to fragment opponents and attract investment. It argues that prospects for transition hinge on recalibrating civil-military bargains, sequencing constitutional guarantees, and generating credible commitment devices that reduce coup fears while expanding civilian authority.

The body opens with a historical overview of military dominance since 1962, tracing how institutionalized command networks, military-owned enterprises and intelligence organs formed a durable power core. It then analyzes the 1988–1991 period: protests, repression, and the reconstitution of rule through councils and legal orders that insulated the officer corps from accountability. A section on the 1990 election explores why overwhelming opposition victory did not translate into power, focusing on the absence of binding caretaker rules and the military’s resolve to preserve guardianship. The article maps possible transition pathways: elite pacts under international guarantees; stepwise legalization of parties and unions; or a developmental legitimation strategy that trades growth for reduced repression. It evaluates external variables—cross-border trade with China and Thailand, refugee flows, and sanctions—arguing that regime adaptation often blunted pressure. The conclusion outlines a reform blueprint emphasizing professional military incentives, constitutional sequencing, and inclusive national dialogues that can transform zero-sum dynamics into a gradual, monitored opening.