EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS IN THE BAY OF BENGAL: THE CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY OF BANGLADESH

The Bay of Bengal has re-emerged as a critical geopolitical and economic hub, drawing attention from regional and global powers such as India, China, the United States, and Japan. As nearly half of global container traffic passes through this maritime corridor, the Bay plays a vital role in trade, security, and energy supply. Bangladesh, situated at the apex of the Bay, faces both opportunities and challenges in navigating the complex power dynamics. Despite growing scholarly attention to the literature on the Bay of Bengal, limited research has examined how Bangladesh should navigate the contemporary power dynamic while safeguarding its national interests. Using a qualitative analytical approach based on secondary data and policy documents, the paper explores Bangladesh’s challenges and possible pathways for advancing its national priorities amid the contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the Bay of Bengal. In this paper, Bangladesh’s role is examined as a case study to also explore how a small yet strategically located nation can both influence and be influenced by larger regional and global powers. The study argues that Bangladesh needs to adopt a pragmatic policy of “minimum risk, maximum benefit,” leveraging economic diplomacy and regional cooperation to uphold national interests amid power rivalries across the Bay of Bengal. 

The Bay of Bengal (BoB), covering approximately 2.173 million square

kilometres (sq.km.), stands as the world’s largest Bay, and nearly half of all global

container traffic passes through this region, with ports in this region managing

roughly one-third of the world’s trade.1 Historically recognised as a vast highway for

commerce, transport, and cultural exchange, the bay’s waters have been traversed by merchants and explorers alike. Today, the region’s core littoral states collectively

host nearly 1.78 billion people and boast a combined gross domestic product (GDP)

of approximately US$ 7.5 trillion.2

Over the centuries, the bay’s strategic and economic significance has been

shaped by waves of migration, trade networks, and imperial ambitions. In recent

decades, however, a profound transformation has taken place. This transformation

has been largely driven by the emergence of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

and the United States (US)-led Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), which have redefined the

BoB as one of the keys of Indo-Pacific geopolitical contestation. The BRI’s massive

infrastructure and connectivity projects, particularly in the South and Southeast

Asia, have expanded China’s economic footprint across the region. In response, the

IPS has sought to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” enhancing the strategic

presence of the US and its allies. Together, these initiatives have transformed

the BoB from a historical trading basin into a central axis of twenty-first-century

maritime geopolitics, where strategic competition, economic interdependence, and

security interests are increasingly converging.3

Moreover, the BoB is drawing strategic attention from other regional powers,

such as India and Japan. Each actor’s pursuit of influence through initiatives like

the BRI, the IPS, and Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) has

transformed the Bay into a site of competing interests. Despite this growing strategic

competition, Bangladesh, situated at the centre of this maritime crossroads, faces the

complex challenge of balancing economic opportunities with geopolitical risks.4 In

this context, “the changes in the BoB are key to understanding Asia’s future,” as Amrit

observes and further argues that the region is driving two major dynamics that will

shape the continent’s trajectory.5 First, the BoB has re-emerged as a theatre of strategic

competition among rising powers, echoing its role in the eighteenth century. The

difference today is that the principal actors are Asian rather than European: both India

and China regard the Bay as strategically significant for energy security, maritime trade,

and cultural outreach. Second, the Bay’s littoral zones constitute one of the world’s

most exposed frontiers of climate risk, with more than half a billion people residing

in densely inhabited coastal areas that are highly vulnerable to environmental change.While existing studies have examined the BoB’s geopolitical importance and

the ambitions of major powers, there is a significant lack of research on Bangladesh’s

challenges and possible pathways to advance its national priorities amid the

contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the BoB. Therefore, this research addresses

the problem of how Bangladesh, as a small yet strategically located state, navigates

the emerging geopolitical rivalry in the BoB while ensuring national security,

economic growth, and regional stability. The research seeks to examine how the

evolving geopolitics of the BoB is reshaping Bangladesh’s national priorities, and to

identify the strategic options through which Bangladesh can mitigate emerging risks

while maximising potential benefits. Bangladesh’s role is examined as a case study

in how a small yet strategically located nation can both influence and be influenced

by larger regional and global power plays. The study adopts primarily a qualitative

methodology anchored in an interpretive research tradition. It relies extensively on

secondary data to analyse the evolving geopolitical environment in the BoB and

Bangladesh’s corresponding strategic challenges. A wide spectrum of literature was

reviewed to develop a holistic understanding of the region’s security dynamics. This

included academic books, peer-reviewed journal articles, dissertations, monographs,

analytical commentaries, as well as reports and news coverage from reputable local

and international outlets. The literature review serves as the basis for tracing both

the historical trajectory and contemporary shifts shaping the BoB’s geopolitical

landscape. It also helped identify existing gaps in scholarship, particularly in relation

to Bangladesh’s security concerns and strategic priorities. By triangulating insights

from diverse sources, the study aims to generate a more refined and contextually

grounded assessment of the region’s emerging security challenges. The interpretive

approach ensures sensitivity to the perspectives, interests, and experiences of the

various state and non-state actors whose actions and interactions are reshaping the

BoB’s strategic calculus.

The discussion is organised into six parts. The first section provides an

introduction. The second section traces the historical “resurgence” of the BoB. The

third section examines contemporary geopolitical dynamics and the competing

interests of the US, China, India, and Japan. The fourth section considers the

challenges confronting Bangladesh and the priorities arising from them. The fifth

section examines Bangladesh’s strategic options for maximising benefits while

minimising risks. The final section offers concluding reflections on the shared future

of the Bay.

The BoB has long served as a vibrant maritime corridor, witnessing

centuries of dynamic trade, cultural exchange, and geopolitical manoeuvring. For millennia, its waters have been traversed by Indian and Malaysian traders, whose

merchant fleets connected the vast lands of South Asia with distant markets. In

addition, Chinese maritime trading, dating back to the 12th century, played a pivotal

role in enriching the region’s economic and cultural tapestry, with the area at times

being known as the “Chola Sea.” Rajendra Chola expanded maritime trade and

influence across Southeast Asia, establishing settlements in Malaysia, Thailand, and

Indonesia while maintaining a trade presence in China.6 This early period of transregional

commerce laid the foundations for what would become a complex web of

interconnections, shaping the economic fortunes and social landscapes of the Bay’s

diverse communities.

The arrival of European powers marked a new chapter in the history of the

BoB. In a move that would forever alter the region’s trajectory, Vasco da Gama

led the first European voyage into these waters in 1498, a voyage that signaled

the beginning of European maritime expansion in Asia. These successive waves

of European intervention turned the BoB into a contested battleground where

imperial ambitions were pursued. The patterns of human migration further shaped

these developments, influencing the establishment of trading posts along the coast.

Between 1840 and 1940, nearly 30 million people migrated from India, with the

vast majority moving back and forth across the BoB, primarily to Ceylon, Burma,

and Malaya.7 This circular migration made the BoB one of the most economically

significant regions.

The BoB has reemerged as a critical maritime basin within the larger Indo-

Pacific framework. Today, its significance is underscored by its strategic location,

linking the emerging economies of South Asia with those of Southeast Asia and

beyond. This “resurge” is driven by several factors that have reinvigorated the

Bay’s role in global commerce and geopolitics. Among the primary catalysts is the

emergence of China as a dominant economic power. Over the past few decades,

China’s rapid industrialisation and ambitious infrastructure projects have reshaped

regional dynamics, drawing renewed attention to key maritime routes, including the

BoB.

Parallel to China’s rise, the US has revised its strategic priorities in what is

often referred to as the “pivot to Asia.”8 Recognising the shifting balance of power,

the US has increased its military and diplomatic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, with the BoB emerging as a crucial element in its broader strategy to secure

free and open sea routes. This US interest in the region is driven not only by security

considerations but also by the desire to maintain access to vital global energy routes

that pass through these waters.

1. 
3. The global energy landscape plays a signifi cant role in the Bay’s resurgence.
4. As the world’s economies continue to expand, demand for energy resources has
5. increased. The BoB, with its proximity to major energy-producing regions and its
6. potential for off shore gas reserve exploration, has become increasingly important.10
7. Another key factor in the Bay’s resurgence is the emergence of new regional
8. economies. The rapid economic growth witnessed across South and Southeast Asia
9. has transformed the BoB into a dynamic centre of commerce and innovation. This
10. economic transformation has not only boosted intra-regional trade but has also 
11. increased the Bay’s relevance in global economic circuits, making it a focal point for
12. investors and policymakers alike.
13. Perhaps the most dramatic recent event contributing to the Bay’s reemergence
14. is the July uprising of 2024 in Bangladesh. The uprising initially
15. emerged from widespread public frustration over governance failures and economic
16. inequality, inadvertently reshaping the country’s political economy and strategic
17. outlook. In the aftermath, the new leadership prioritised restoring international
18. confidence, rebranding Bangladesh as a stable and reform-oriented economy.11
19. Indeed, the uprising’s geopolitical implications were also significant.12 Bangladesh’s
20. changing foreign policy approach after the Sheikh Hasina regime, especially its
21. current tension with India, while deepening ties with China, and even Pakistan,13 is a
22. significant factor shaping the geopolitical outlook of the Bay. The cumulative impact
23. of these diverse factors has led to a reimagining of the BoB’s role. No longer can
24. the Bay be viewed solely as a relic of colonial maritime history; it is now a dynamic
25. and contested space where the interplay of economic opportunity and geopolitical
26. rivalry defines its future.

The BoB has emerged as a critical theatre in the global geopolitical arena,

driven by the strategic imperatives of major powers and the complex interplay of

regional interests. As traditional alliances and economic priorities evolve, the littorals

of the Bay have become a focal point for competing narratives.

3.1 The US’s Strategy in the Bay

The US’s engagement in the BoB is shaped by its broader IPS, which

aims to counter China’s influence and ensure a free and open maritime order. The

2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)14 reinforces this approach

by authorising US$ 14.7 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and establishing the Indo-Pacific Campaigning Initiative to enhance military exercises,

freedom of navigation operations, and partner engagements. It also provides US$ 1.3

billion for campaigning activities, including military training and capacity-building

programmes with regional allies.15 The Act strengthens security cooperation with key

partners like India, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan, including enhanced military cyber

security collaborations, training initiatives, and arms sales such as the transfer of

Virginia-class submarines to Australia under AUKUS. Additionally, it expands cyber

cooperation with Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia while

advancing a strategy for deploying ground-based theatre-range missile capabilities

in the Indo-Pacific. American efforts to promote free and open maritime domains,

coupled with the development of regional defence capacities, are central to its vision

of an Indo-Pacific order that limits the expansion of Chinese influence.

3.1.1 Implications of the Trump Administration

Under President Donald Trump’s administration (Trump 2.0), US policy in

the Indo-Pacific increasingly emphasised India as a pivotal partner to counterbalance

China. This India-centric approach manifested in enhanced defence cooperation,

strategic alignment, and economic engagement between Washington and New

Delhi. While strengthening US-India ties was central to the Trump administration’s

regional strategy, it inadvertently sidelined the strategic interests of smaller BoB

countries, notably Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s concerns about maintaining a peaceful,

inclusive, and economically prosperous BoB often received less attention amid the

larger geopolitical contest focused on India-China rivalry.16

This shift was evident during the visit of the US National Intelligence

Director Tulsi Gabbard to India, where she made controversial remarks about

Bangladesh, alleging that the country harbours elements of “Islamic Caliphate”

and persecuted minorities, claims that Bangladesh strongly refuted.17 The incident

signalled that the US under Trump is more aligned with India’s rhetoric, reinforcing

India’s strategic position in the region while neglecting Bangladesh’s interests.

This imbalance undermined the possibility of a cooperative Indo-Pacific, as the

US appeared to prioritise countering China through Indian partnerships rather than

fostering inclusive regional cooperation. The warming relations between the US and Russia, particularly Trump’s

rapprochement with President Vladimir Putin, also have implications for the region.

India welcomes these efforts, as it views Russia as a necessary pole in a multipolar

world and seeks continued Russian arms supplies to counter China.18 If Trump

successfully disengages Russia from China, it could bolster India’s strategic position

while further embedding US-India defence ties in the Indo-Pacific. However, these

developments risk marginalising Bangladesh’s security and economic interests, as

the BoB becomes a theatre for great power competition rather than a zone of regional

cooperation and shared prosperity.

Therefore, while the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific policy aligned

with its broader goal of countering China through robust partnerships, its strong

India-centric orientation risked undermining Bangladesh’s aspirations for a balanced

and peaceful regional order.19 Moving forward, a more inclusive US strategy that

recognises the strategic importance of Bangladesh and other smaller Indo-Pacific

states beyond the India-China binary will be critical to fostering long-term stability,

economic growth, and regional cooperation in the BoB. However, the geopolitical

landscape has been shifting, with growing recognition among US policymakers that

sustainable regional stability requires engaging a broader spectrum of Indo-Pacific

actors, not only India and China. Moving forward, a more inclusive US strategy that

acknowledges the strategic importance of Bangladesh and other smaller Indo-Pacific

states beyond the India-China binary will be critical to fostering long-term stability,

economic growth, and regional cooperation in the BoB.20

3.2 China’s Approach toward the Indo-Pacific and BoB

China’s strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific and the BoB is driven

primarily by its BRI, with the Maritime Silk Road forming the backbone of its

regional connectivity ambitions. This initiative seeks to establish critical trade and

infrastructure networks that reduce China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait by

creating alternative sea routes through Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The

BoB plays a crucial role in this strategy, as China aims to develop ports, fuelling

stations, and industrial corridors to secure its trade and energy supply chains. The

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a key component of the BRI vision, providing direct access to the Arabian Sea and reducing logistical vulnerabilities.21

Additionally, China’s investments in ports like Kyaukpyu in Myanmar and

Hambantota in Sri Lanka enhance its strategic presence in the region, allowing

for both economic expansion and potential military utility, thereby strengthening

its influence over critical maritime routes. Other projects, ranging from the Hydro

Power Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia to port facilities in Kota Bharu, Malaysia,

extend this web deeper into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region, furthering

China’s commercial and strategic objectives.22

Beyond the immediate BoB, China’s strategy includes integrating these

regional hubs with distant outposts such as Nairobi Terminus in Kenya and Piraeus

Port in Greece, framing the Bay as a central node within China’s global BRI

network.23 These interlinked ventures not only enhance connectivity and investment

prospects but also foster strategic dependencies, gradually shifting regional dynamics

and power balances in China’s favour. While promising economic development, this

expansive footprint has prompted apprehension among neighbouring states about

Beijing’s rising leverage and potential military utility over the surrounding littoral

zones.24As illustrated in Figure 2, these initiatives have enabled Beijing to broaden

its presence across the BoB, effectively surrounding the region through a network

of strategic projects. Although such initiatives provide considerable advantages

in terms of connectivity, infrastructure, and investment, they have also generated

unease among regional actors, who are wary that China’s expanding role may confer

enduring strategic leverage over the littoral states.

• 
• From a strategic perspective, this evolving network is often perceived as
• China’s pursuit of the “String of Pearls” strategy, creating a series of commercial
• ports with latent military potential across the Indian Ocean. The BoB, positioned
• between the Malacca Strait and the Arabian Sea, becomes crucial for maintaining
• China’s access to global sea lanes while offsetting its “Malacca Dilemma.” This
• growing Chinese presence challenges India’s traditional dominance in the Bay,
• prompting New Delhi to advance counter-initiatives such as the SAGAR vision
• and to strengthen cooperation within frameworks like the Quadrilateral Security
• Dialogue (QUAD) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
• and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).26 Consequently, the Bay is transforming
• into a theater of strategic competition between China and other Indo-Pacific powers,
• where infrastructure becomes an instrument of geopolitical influence rather than
• mere economic development.
• At the same time, the economic interdependence of the BRI member
• states serves as Beijing’s subtle yet powerful instrument of influence. Through
• concessional loans, port development, and industrial projects, China deepens the
• economic reliance of smaller littoral states, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka,
• on its financial ecosystem.27 While such investments enhance connectivity and create
• employment, they also risk institutionalising dependency, as seen in Sri Lanka’s
• Hambantota Port lease or Myanmar’s growing debt exposure. These dynamics allow 
• Beijing to exercise leverage without direct coercion, aligning with what scholar’s
• term “economic statecraft.”28 The dual nature of developmental and strategic, thus
• blurs the line between cooperation and control, raising questions about whether
• China’s engagement in the BoB is fostering inclusive regional growth or embedding
• new hierarchies of dependency.
• 3.3 India’s Transitory Strategy: From Non-Alignment to Assertive Security
• Politics
• Historically, India adhered to a policy of non-alignment, but the changing
• dynamics of regional security and economic challenges have compelled New
• Delhi to adopt a more assertive posture in the BoB. India’s strategic interest in the
• Indo-Pacific and the BoB is deeply tied to its Act East Policy (AEP), which has
• evolved over the past decade. AEP, launched in 2014, marks a significant shift from
• India’s previous Look East Policy, placing a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia
• and the broader Indo-Pacific region in India’s geostrategic outlook. One of the key
• components of AEP is its alignment with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
• (ASEAN) political vision of the Indo-Pacific, particularly through the ASEAN
• Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). India’s commitment to ASEAN centrality and
• unity has driven its diplomatic engagement in the region, enhancing its strategic
• partnerships and fostering high-level exchanges, with Prime Minister Modi’s 26
• visits to ASEAN countries being a notable indicator of India’s growing presence in
• the region from 2014 to 2024.29 India’s strategic interests are also deeply rooted in its
• SAGAR initiative, which was first articulated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on
• March 12, 2015, during his visit to Mauritius. Recognising that 90 per cent of India’s
• trade and energy imports transit through the Indian Ocean, India has prioritised
• securing vital sea lanes by strengthening maritime security, regional stability, and
• economic cooperation.30 This commitment is evident in joint naval exercises such
• as Bongosagar 2025 with Bangladesh,31 as well as through agreements like whiteshipping
• information sharing, signed between India and Mauritius to enhance
• maritime domain awareness.32
• Beyond maritime security, India has sought to counter China’s growing
• influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the BoB. China’s BRI has led to
• increasing infrastructure investments and naval engagements, prompting India to
• bolster its regional presence through strategic infrastructure projects. Mauritius
• remains a critical partner in India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, serving as a key node in
• its SAGAR framework. During his visit to Mauritius on March 11–12, 2025, Prime
• Minister Modi reaffirmed Mauritius’s importance to India.33 India has deepened its
• ties through defence cooperation, providing Mauritius with support for the refitting
• of Coast Guard ships and assisting in establishing the National Maritime Information
• Sharing Centre to improve maritime security. This increasing alignment between
• India and Mauritius is a direct response to China’s expanding presence in the region.
• Recognising the broader geopolitical challenges, India’s vision has evolved beyond
• SAGAR into Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across
• Regions (MAHASAGAR), as announced by Prime Minister Modi on 12 March
• 2025.34 This expanded strategy aims to reinforce India’s leadership role in the Indo-
• Pacific while ensuring that no single power, especially China, dominates the region’s
• strategic and economic landscape.
• 3.4 Japan’s Role: Economic Investments and BIG-B
• Japan’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific and the BoB are deeply
• connected with its economic diplomacy and regional connectivity initiatives,
• primarily through the BoB Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B). This initiative was
• first introduced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his visit to Bangladesh in
• September 2014, following a bilateral summit in Tokyo in May 2014 with high
• officials of Bangladesh, where both countries agreed to strengthen ties through the
• Japan-Bangladesh Comprehensive Partnership. Under BIG-B, Japan committed 600
• billion Yen (approximately US$ 6 billion) in official development assistance (ODA)
• loans over four to five years, emphasising infrastructure development and industrial
• connectivity in Bangladesh.35
• 
• A critical aspect of Japan’s Indo-Pacifi c strategy is its focus on enhancing
• Bangladesh’s role as a regional industrial and trade hub, particularly through the
• development of the Dhaka-Chittagong-Cox’s Bazar corridor (see Figure 3). The
• Matarbari Deep Sea Port, a key Japanese-backed infrastructure project, is positioned
• to serve not only Bangladesh but also facilitate trade and industrial supply chains
• with Northeast India. This aligns with Japan’s broader strategy, as outlined by Prime
• Minister Fumio Kishida in 2023, during his visit to India, where he emphasised the
• “BoB-Northeast India industrial value chain.”37 The proposed Japanese industrial
• hub in Bangladesh is expected to integrate Northeast India’s natural resources with
• Bangladesh’s growing manufacturing sector, enhancing economic interdependence.
• Japan’s engagement in the region also serves its Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c (FOIP)
• vision, countering China’s BRI while ensuring resilient and sustainable infrastructure
• in Bangladesh and the broader BoB region. Japan’s involvement in infrastructure
• development in Northeast India, including highways, bridges, and energy projects,
• refl ects its strategic interest in reducing logistical bottlenecks and securing stable
• industrial supply chains across South and Southeast Asia.
• 36
• The economic partnership between Japan and Bangladesh has grown
• significantly, with over 350 Japanese companies operating in Bangladesh, contributing
• to an annual bilateral trade volume of US$ 4 billion.38 During a meeting on 15 January
• 2025, President Mohammed Shahabuddin urged Japanese Ambassador Shinichi
• Saida to enhance Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bangladesh’s emerging
• industries, such as automobiles, information and communication technology (ICT),
• medical equipment, consumer electronics, and tourism.39 The BIG-B initiative, with
• its emphasis on connectivity, modern infrastructure, and industrial development, is
• crucial for integrating Bangladesh into global value chains. As Bangladesh aspires to
• position itself as a “sparkling trading nation,”40 Japan’s FDI and advanced industrial
• technology will be key enablers. However, for this vision to materialise, Bangladesh
• must implement policy reforms, improve its investment climate, and develop a
• skilled workforce capable of meeting the demands of high-tech manufacturing and
• export-oriented industries.

Bangladesh finds itself at the apex of the inverted funnel-shaped water body

of the BoB, a region that is a crucial nexus of maritime and economic activity in South

Asia. Bangladesh is uniquely positioned to leverage its geographical advantages

with a “blue economy” that contributes over US$ 6 billion, amounting to roughly

3.3 per cent of the country’s total gross value addition, as of the 2014–15 fiscal

year.41 However, the country stands at the crossroads of both immense prospects and

significant challenges.

4.1 Prospects: Hydrocarbon Resources, Mineral Wealth, and Regional

Connectivity

One of the most promising prospects for Bangladesh lies in the vast untapped

resources of the BoB. Geological studies have repeatedly suggested that beneath the

Bay’s surface lie extensive deposits of hydrocarbons and mineral wealth. The Bay

is believed to host a rich core of solidified natural gas, commonly referred to as

“Diamond,” “Gas hydrates,” or gas pods, which although located at much greater

depths compared to similar reserves in the Arabian Sea, could prove transformative for Bangladesh’s energy sector.42 While neighbouring Myanmar and India have

already discovered signifi cant gas reserves. Bangladesh remains a relative newcomer

in deep-sea exploration. The potential discovery and exploitation of these resources

could not only secure a stable energy infl ow for Bangladesh but also signifi cantly

boost its industrial base and export earnings.

Beyond hydrocarbons, the BoB holds promise as a repository of various

mineral nodules. As global demand for raw materials intensifi es, harnessing these

resources could lead to substantial economic benefi ts. However, realising these

benefi ts will require comprehensive surveys, advanced technological interventions,

and a regulatory framework that encourages both state-led and private investments

in exploration and extraction activities. Another signifi cant prospect for Bangladesh

is its strategic position as a connecting route between South and Southeast Asia.44

Bangladesh’s unique geographical location makes it an indispensable node and hub

in regional connectivity. With the BoB serving as a natural corridor, Bangladesh

is well placed to facilitate trade and commerce between diverse regional markets.

This connectivity extends not only to neighbouring South Asian countries but also to

Southeast Asia, enhancing Bangladesh’s role in inter-regional economic integration.

The ongoing development of transport and logistics infrastructure, including ports,

roads, and rail links could further cement this role, transforming Bangladesh into a

critical transit hub that supports both regional trade and global supply chains.

4.2 Challenges Amidst Emerging Geopolitical Rivalries and Non-Traditional

Security Threats

While the prospects are considerable, Bangladesh faces a multifaceted set of

challenges that stem from both traditional and non-traditional security dimensions.

One of the primary challenges is adapting to the renewed rivalries among major

powers in the Indo-Pacific region. In recent years, the BoB has witnessed an

intensification of great power competition, with the US, China, and India each

pursuing divergent strategic visions. This renewed rivalry threatens to fragment the

region’s cooperative framework, potentially sidelining the interests of littoral states

like Bangladesh. The moment for regional integration in the BoB is slipping away

because external powers like China and India increasingly pursue their own strategic

interests, prioritise bilateral projects, and exert influence over regional agendas. This

results in a fragmented approach where smaller littoral states, such as Bangladesh, see

their interests sidelined, and opportunities for cooperation and shared development

are undermined by geopolitical competition and a lack of regional consensus.45

These challenges are further intertwined with several non-traditional

security challenges. For example, climate risks, environmental disasters, and

resource management are now influenced by wider geopolitical interests. Because

of this connection, Bangladesh now faces a more complicated security environment

where geopolitical tensions and non-traditional risks reinforce one another.46 Since

the BoB is essential for Bangladesh’s energy, trade, and fisheries, any rise in military

activities, competition for maritime influence, or poorly planned infrastructure

projects by external actors can directly affect Bangladesh’s economic stability

and environmental health. In this context, ensuring energy security from the BoB

becomes even more challenging. While offshore resources have great potential, their

development is limited by high costs, a lack of advanced technology, and political pressures surrounding foreign investment and exploration rights. At the same time,

weaknesses in infrastructure and logistics further slowdown progress, preventing

Bangladesh from fully benefiting from the Bay’s energy resources.47

4.3 Economic Development as a Priority

Given these challenges, Bangladesh’s foremost priority remains economic

development. The country has experienced rapid growth in recent decades, emerging

as a dynamic and increasingly resilient economy in South Asia. With the blue

economy contributing to the sectors such as tourism, marine fisheries and aquaculture,

transport and offshore oil and gas extraction, it holds tremendous potential for further

growth. A 2018 World Bank report underscored the importance of a coordinated

planning process and a long-term strategy for transitioning to a fully-fledged blue

economy. The report emphasised the need to remove bottlenecks and constraints in

resource exploitation while advocating for a systematic assessment of the natural

capital inherent in the BoB.48

For Bangladesh, economic development is not just about increasing

GDP; it is also about creating a sustainable framework for inclusive growth. This

involves modernising existing industries, developing new ocean economy sectors,

and integrating into global value chains. There is a pressing need for government

policies that incentivise investments in technology and innovation, particularly in

sectors that can harness the Bay’s resources efficiently. Such policies should focus

on enhancing infrastructure, streamlining regulatory processes, and fostering

partnerships between the public and private sectors. By doing so, Bangladesh can

unlock the full potential of its maritime assets and transform its economy into a

competitive and globally integrated hub. Moreover, regional connectivity plays a

vital role in economic development. Bangladesh’s position as a transit hub between

South and Southeast Asia can be leveraged to boost trade, facilitate the movement

of goods, and create new market opportunities. Strategic investments in ports

and transportation networks are essential for improving logistics and reducing

trade costs. These investments would not only enhance Bangladesh’s economic

prospects but also contribute to regional integration and cooperation, making the

BoB a vibrant corridor of economic activity. 4.4 Security and Regional Stability as Imperatives

While economic development remains paramount, ensuring security and

stability in the region is equally critical for Bangladesh. The security challenges

faced by Bangladesh are complex and multifaceted, ranging from conventional

maritime threats to non-traditional challenges such as cyber-security, environmental

degradation, and transnational crime. The BoB, despite its relatively peaceful history

compared to regions like the South China Sea, is not immune to the emerging security

risks posed by the shifting geopolitical landscape.

Historically, the maritime boundaries in the BoB have been relatively

well managed, with disputes between India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar being

resolved through international arbitration, largely thanks to proactive initiatives by

Bangladesh.49 This cooperative approach has fostered a positive environment for

building a regional community, enabling the creation of forums such as BIMSTEC.

However, the re-emergence of intra-regional conflicts, most notably the enduring

Rohingya crisis, has the potential to destabilise the region and hinder the process

of regional integration. Continued instability in Myanmar, for example, the current

presence of the Arakan Army in Rakhine state, leads to unpredictable security threats

that could spill over into neighbouring countries, further complicating the security

architecture of the Bay.

Given the strategic importance of the BoB, it is imperative that Bangladesh

adopts a proactive stance in shaping regional security dynamics. This includes

engaging in multilateral security cooperation with neighbouring states, strengthening

maritime surveillance and defence capabilities, and participating actively in regional

security forums. By doing so, Bangladesh can not only protect its own interests but

also contribute to the collective security of the entire BoB region. The challenge,

however, lies in balancing national priorities with regional obligations, a task that

requires careful diplomacy and strategic foresight.

Bangladesh has already adopted a balancing approach to deal with the

matter of BoB for a prosperous Indo-Pacific and BoB. One of the core tenets of

Bangladesh’s foreign policy is fostering peaceful and inclusive rise. By participating

in key regional organisations and promoting multilateralism, Bangladesh seeks

to harness collective benefits for economic growth while minimising the risks of

over-dependence on any single nation or geopolitical bloc. Bangladesh’s diplomatic  strategy is that it avoids unnecessary confrontation, aligns national interests with

global norms, attracts foreign investments, and capitalises on regional opportunities.

Additionally, the interim government has shifted towards a diversified diplomacy,

focusing on strengthening relations with neighbouring countries, including Pakistan,

to balance its foreign policy. This strategic recalibration is particularly significant,

as it enables Bangladesh to retain its strategic autonomy while mitigating the risks

that arise from over-dependence on India. This strategic balancing act also reflects

Bangladesh’s desire to maintain its domestic development goals while participating

in global and regional forums. For instance, Bangladesh is looking to be a sectoral

dialogue partner in ASEAN.50 The country is also focusing on achieving substantial

economic growth through multilateral cooperation, aligning its interests with

organisations such as the BoB Initiative for BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Rim

Association (IORA), and Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) framework.

Despite these existing policies, several policy directions for Bangladesh can

accelerate the ‘minimum risk and maximum benefit’ approach in an increasingly

competitive Indo-Pacific environment.

5.1 Formulating a Comprehensive National Maritime Strategy

Scholars highlight that great-power rivalry has narrowed the strategic space

for smaller littoral states, and Bangladesh’s lack of a unified maritime framework

increases its vulnerability. Besides amid increasing geopolitical rivalry, Bangladesh’s

balancing acts may going to be challenging to pursue in the future. To address this,

Bangladesh should develop a National Maritime Strategy that integrates security

priorities, blue economy goals, and diplomatic engagement. Such a strategy would

streamline interagency efforts, guide long-term resource management in the maritime

domain. It would also enhance strategic predictability, improve crisis preparedness,

and reduce the risk of Bangladesh being drawn into zero-sum rivalries among major

powers.

5.2 Expanding Diversified and Issue-Based Partnerships

Scholars have argued that smaller Indo-Pacific states benefit most from

diversified cooperation rather than alignment with any single major power.

Bangladesh’s existing balancing approach provides a solid foundation for this, but

future conditions will require even more flexible and issue-based engagements.

Accordingly, Bangladesh should deepen cooperation with a broad group of partners—

including India, China, Japan, the European Union (EU), and the United States—

based on sector-specific needs and opportunities for sustainable gains. Priority areas

include maritime domain awareness, climate adaptation, high-quality infrastructure

development, technology transfer, and digital innovation. At the same time, sustained

participation in BIMSTEC, IORA, and ASEAN-led mechanisms will be essential

for reinforcing multilateralism, strengthening regional norms, and ensuring that

Bangladesh remains embedded within a broader cooperative architecture.

5.3 Strengthening Sustainable Blue Economy Development

Research on blue economy governance indicates that Bangladesh’s maritime

potential including offshore energy, fisheries, shipping, and logistics, cannot be fully

realised without overcoming technological, financial, and environmental constraints.51

Bangladesh should therefore prioritise climate-resilient investments and enforce strict

environmental and social safeguards in all coastal and maritime projects. Strengthening

regulatory oversight, promoting innovation in marine resource management, and

supporting community-centred livelihoods will be vital for sustaining long-term

economic benefits. These measures would not only reduce ecological risks but

also limit strategic vulnerabilities by ensuring that external investments align with

Bangladesh’s national interests and environmental commitments.

5.4 Enhancing Institutional Capacity for Maritime Governance

To implement these strategic priorities effectively, Bangladesh must strengthen

institutional capacities across maritime agencies, research institutions, and regulatory

bodies.52 This includes improving interagency coordination, investing in modern surveillance

and monitoring systems, and expanding training programmes to build technical expertise.

Strengthening academic and policy research on maritime issues will further support

evidence-based decision-making and enhance Bangladesh’s ability to anticipate emerging

challenges. A more capable institutional ecosystem would also improve Bangladesh’s

bargaining power in negotiations with external partners and enable the country to manage

its maritime domain with greater autonomy and strategic confidence.

This research has analysed the geopolitical interests of key players in

the Indo-Pacific, namely the US, China, India, and Japan, and the challenges faced by Bangladesh to understand possible ways forward. First, while the

Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific policy was focused on countering China

by strengthening partnerships, its strong emphasis on India risked sidelining

Bangladesh’s hopes for a balanced and peaceful regional order. Going forward, a

more inclusive US strategy that recognises the strategic importance of Bangladesh

and other smaller Indo-Pacific countries beyond just India and China is essential

for encouraging long-term stability, economic growth, and cooperation in the

BoB. Secondly, China’s investments in port facilities, logistics hubs, and energy

projects across the Indo-Pacific aim not just to secure trade routes but to create a

network of strategic dependencies. These developments have allowed China to

expand its presence around the BoB, surrounding it with various projects. While

these projects bring connectivity and economic benefits, they also raise concerns

among regional countries about China’s growing influence that might translate

into long-term strategic control. Thirdly, India has responded to China’s regional

expansion by deepening its partnerships, exemplified by its growing alignment with

Mauritius and the evolution of its SAGAR policy into MAHASAGAR, which seeks

to extend India’s leadership role in the Indo-Pacific and prevent dominance by any

single country, particularly China. This would be challenging for Bangladesh to

balance Sino-Indian geopolitical interests. Fourthly, Bangladesh aspires to become

a “sparkling trading nation,” closely linked with Japanese FDI and advanced

technology, that offer critical support to reach the goal. However, for Bangladesh

to realise this vision, it must reform policies, improve the investment climate, and

develop a skilled workforce capable of meeting emerging economic demands.

Therefore, the BoB has witnessed increased competition from the US, China,

and India, each pursuing different strategic goals. This competition threatens to

weaken the regional cooperative framework, leaving smaller states like Bangladesh

marginalised. The moment for greater regional integration risks being lost as

external powers prioritise their own agendas, pushing smaller countries’ interests

aside and reducing chances for shared development. But the geopolitical rivalry

is further complicated by non-traditional security threats affecting Bangladesh’s

maritime interests, such as the need for investments in deep-sea resource exploration,

sustainable extraction techniques, and resolving financial and technical challenges.

Infrastructural constraints also hamper Bangladesh’s ability to fully utilise the Bay’s

natural wealth and potential. However, some recent diplomatic changes may not

be fully reflected due to the fast-changing geopolitical situation. Limited access

to detailed data means reliance on secondary sources, which might have gaps or

biases. Domestic political shifts in Bangladesh’s interim government have also made

it difficult to identify long-term trends. Certain areas, like environmental impacts,

technology transfer, and local social effects, have not been covered in detail, which

can be addressed in future studies. Nevertheless, this study has recommended that Bangladesh needs to adopt

a pragmatic strategy to ‘minimum risk, maximum benefit’ by focusing on four key

areas, due to contemporary development in domestic politics and geopolitics in

BoB. First, it should develop a comprehensive national maritime strategy that unifies

security, economic, and diplomatic goals to manage rising great-power rivalry

effectively. Second, the country should expand diversified, issue-based partnerships

with multiple regional and global powers tailored to sectoral needs, while actively

engaging in multilateral platforms like BIMSTEC and IORA to strengthen regional

cooperation. Third, Bangladesh must prioritise climate-resilient and sustainable blue

economy development by investing in technology and enforcing strict environmental

safeguards to ensure long-term resource sustainability and reduce dependence on

external actors. Finally, enhancing institutional capacity for maritime governance

through better coordination, research, and expertise will empower Bangladesh to

assert its strategic interests and negotiate confidently in the evolving geopolitical

environment.