WITHER NUCLEAR DETERRENCE? A MINIMUM POSTURE IN SOUTH ASIA

India and Pakistan, despite being nuclear weapon states, have frequently engaged in conventional military conflicts. Given the regional and domestic environment, nuclear deterrence has been in decay. Both countries are exploiting the stability-instability paradox and testing the nuclear threshold times and again, which further creates the threat of more conventional conflicts and nuclear escalation. This article argues that nuclear deterrence, though checked strategic level stability between India and Pakistan, failed to end frequent conventional escalation; rather, traditional diplomacy and non-nuclear deterrence are comparatively effective regarding the nature of the relationship between India and Pakistan. The paper also argues that multipolarity and nuclear capability, advanced technologies and AI, dilemma with stabilityinstability paradox, populist leadership and popular psychology, and weak communication, etc., are the key reasons behind the minimum deterrence posture. The paper discusses the effectiveness of non-nuclear deterrence to ensure stability and peace in South Asia.

The history of World War II depicts a terrible story of weapons ever invented by humans, obviously, that is the story of nuclear bombs and their brutal devastation on Japanese territory. Since then, a heinous competition has been started between the Cold War superpowers for acquiring more sophisticated nuclear weapons. However, though the realists were concerned over the possible obliteration of the earth due to nuclear armaments, there were some arguments in favour of nuclear weapons. For instance, the presence of nuclear arms between or among great powers would create deterrence, which could ultimately prevent conflicts and war between or among nuclear states. The latter position was based on the argument of reciprocal vulnerability and credible retaliation (zero-zero game). For example, what happened in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After the early decade of the 21st century, the credibility of nuclear deterrence has been diminishing due to the engagement of a number of nuclear powers in conflicts and war quite recently. Several contributing factors make nuclear deterrence more fragile, less predictable, and increasingly unable to prevent limited war or coercion. For example, there are several key factors: firstly, the weakening of nuclear arms-control regimes; secondly, multipolar complexity in nuclear competition; thirdly, diffusion of disruptive technologies; fourthly, presence of non-nuclear deterrence; and fifthly, changes in national psyche (no-harm feelings) of the state, etc. destabilised the nuclear deterrence system. Therefore, previously, war-like situations and conflicts among nuclear states were controlled by deterrence, which has now been shifted to a response to the weapons. This study argues that nuclear deterrence has hardly succeeded in ending coercion and limited war, rather traditional way of diplomacy in reducing escalation between India and Pakistan has become prevalent in recent times. To supplement the argument, this study investigates three basic questions: Why has nuclear deterrence been strained in India-Pakistan relations? How far is non-nuclear deterrence relevant to de-escalating conventional conflicts? What will be the future of nuclear deterrence and peace in the region? In this paper, the term ‘wither’ has been used in the title synonymously with erosion, weakening, and decay of nuclear deterrence. The Cold War drew repeated attention to the concept of deterrence, which is often used synonymously with nuclear deterrence. Although the nuclear dimension of deterrence is significant, it is a part of the overarching theory comprising economic, diplomatic, and military power.1 India and Pakistan—the two colonies of the British Raj and South Asian neighbours—acquired their nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1990s, respectively, and found placement in the nine-member club of global nuclear powers. They have developed their nuclear arsenals to counter the nuclear threats posed against each other. However, since the partition of India in 1947, the relationship has remained strained between them, what sometimes labelled as ‘prisoner of partition’.2 Despite being nuclear weapon holders, due to socio-cultural, religious, and political differences, they have engaged in several conventional conflicts, raising the fear of further escalation to nuclear warfare.The rivalry between these two countries trickled down from sports to culture to media and politics. Moreover, regional geopolitical and strategic shifts have also made their relationships more tense and complex. Their confrontations are not viewed as bilateral theatre; rather, an evolving crisis sourced from shifting geostrategic architecture in the Indo-Pacific, where great power competition, bloc politics, and nuclear deterrence clash.3 Moreover, both countries are involved not only in bilateral rivalry but also in competing geopolitical blocs. India has been maintaining good relations with the United States (US), including a defense agreement, partnering with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), etc. On

the contrary, Pakistan, though once strongly tied with the US, has now navigated its move to China, having Chinese economic support through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project and military assistance. Therefore, military escalation and nuclear deterrence are involved in complex regional geopolitics. However, India and Pakistan have engaged in several conventional arms-conflict undermining the nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Erosion of the deterrence poses a serious threat to the regional peace and stability in the South Asian region. Having this brief background, this study will explore the underlying factors behind the erosion and the future of deterrence and peace in South Asia. The study is mainly qualitative in nature and is based on secondary sources such as newspapers, books, journals, official documents, websites, and reports etc. There are five sections in this paper. Following the introduction, the second section discusses the nuclear deterrence from theoretical perspectives, while the third section addresses the erosion of deterrence in the context of India-Pakistan relations; the fourth section discusses the future of deterrence and peace in South Asia, and finally,the last section concludes the paper.

The word ‘deterrence’, though very often used interchangeably as ‘nuclear deterrence’, has a long history of practice. Nevertheless, the terminology also accommodates military, economic, and diplomatic deterrence as well. This study focuses on only military deterrence, that is, more specifically, nuclear deterrence.Existing literature demonstrates multiple meanings and implications of the term. The idea of deterrence gained prominence during the Cold War and led to some of the earliest scholarly studies in the late 1940s. Thomas Schelling is frequently credited as the father of the deterrence theory, and his seminal publications titled “The Strategy of Conflict (1981)” and “Arms and Influence (1966)” have been very often cited as the foundational texts of coercion and deterrence theory.4 Schelling, an economist, was aware of the use of bargaining for military strategists. Those with more military might could disregard those with less might because the latter were unable to cause serious harm. But in symmetric warfare, the focus has shifted from a contest of strength to a contest of endurance, risk-taking, and strategic decisionmaking. The word “deterrence” comes from the Latin “terrere”, which means “to frighten”. Deterrence, as a term, relates to the psychological process. It denotes convincing a subject to refrain from acting. It is based on emotions such as ‘fear of punishment’ or ‘will to suffer’. In this context, deterrence means “discouraging (someone) from doing something by instilling doubt or fear of the consequences”.5 As Freedman notes, “deterrence can be a technique, doctrine, and a state of mind”.6 In all cases, it is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing risks associated with crossing these boundaries. Again, Snyder called deterrence the “power to dissuade.”7 while George and Smoke outlined deterrence as, ‘‘simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action...outweigh its benefits.’’8 Furthermore, deterrence is described by Schelling as “a threat... intended to keep an adversary from doing something.’’9 The broader objective of deterrence is to prevent certain actions by another actor, be it a state, a leader, a group, or any other entity. Therefore, deterrence can be defined as an act, or as a state, posture, or structure.10 Overall, deterrence is a policy design intended to prevent an actor from executing a specific desired course of action.11 The foundation of successful and effective deterrence is the knowledge that deterrence is centred on the adversary’s (the subject of deterrence) mindset, and that the adversary must be persuaded that the other state’s deterrence posture is adequate to prevent the adversary’s action from succeeding. The phrase “deterrence” has been used to describe the fundamental strategy of the nuclear powers and the key alliance systems since the invention of nuclear weapons. In international relations, nuclear deterrence is a principle in which states (having nuclear weapons) avoid launching attacks against each other due to possibility of retaliation and destructive force of nuclear weapons.12 Scholars tried to determine necessary conditions to nuclear deterrence, for example, Kenneth Waltz argued for three requirements that must be met for nuclear deterrence to be effective13: firstly, a portion of a state’s nuclear weapons must seem able to withstand an enemy attack and to be employed for a second strike in retaliation; secondly, the state must not respond to false warnings of an enemy strike; and thirdly, command and control over the arsenal must be maintained by the state. Above mentioned requirements underpin two basic conditions of nuclear deterrence: the ability to respond following a surprise assault must be seen as credible, and the desire to retaliate must be seen as a possibility, but not necessarily a guarantee.14 The renewed interest has grown in nuclear deterrence in international politics after the commencement of the Cold War, and the debates on the effectiveness of deterrence have remained a key issue in the domain of war and conflict studies. While the stabilityinstability paradox claims the decrease in probability of direct war between two nuclear states, the theory acknowledges the increase in indirect or lower intensity conflicts15 and thus normalises minor conventional conflicts. With the advent of modern technologies, multipolarity of nuclear states, influence of non-nuclear deterrence, internationalisation of deterrence, etc., might affect the magnitude of nuclear deterrence as a strategy to stop coercion, conflict, limited war, or proxy wars. Again, populism and propaganda, command and control in the age of artificial intelligence (AI) and misinformation have also challenged the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Additionally, with the evolving nature of regional and global politics, the number of nuclear states has been on the rise, which has also created multi-pronged difficulties in effective deterrence.

According to SIPRI, as of January 2025, there are an estimated 12405 warheads in the world’s arsenal, of which 9614 are in military stocks for possible deployment. Besides, as the Arms Control Association estimated, 90 per cent of the total warheads are combinedly possessed by the US and Russia.17 Although under the New START agreement, both countries agreed to cap their warhead deployment at 1550, the recent suspension of the agreement by Russia indicates the uncertainty of the renewal agreement after 2026.18 Moreover, six countries are hosting another country’s nuclear weapons, and 28 countries (plus hosting countries) (see Table 2) are endorsing the possession of nuclear weapons as a part of their defence alliance, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).19

Therefore, concerns are looming around the future of the nuclear race, as Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme expressed: “The era of reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in the world, which had lasted since the end of the Cold War, is coming to an end. Instead, we see a clear trend of growing nuclear arsenals, sharpened nuclear rhetoric and the abandonment of arms control agreements.”20 In addition, resilience to deterrence, both nuclear and non-nuclear, as appeared in the Russia-Ukraine War, is a major concern over the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in different regions of the world. This complexity may encourage the horizontal escalation21 of conflicts, as Bruno Tertrais expressed, “aggression in one area can be countered by retaliation in another”.22 Moreover, technological sophistication, such as missile defense systems and hypersonic weapons, etc., has made non-nuclear counterattacks more feasible, and the distinctions between conventional and nuclear conflict have become blurred. Besides, weaker command, control, and communication systems jeopardise deterrence and increase the risks of unintentional conflicts. 

This paper is to reassess the nuclear deterrence in the context of evolving regional order in Asia and draw attention to the case study of India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence to understand the eff ectiveness of the deterrence and the potential of future peace means. The paper has examined multiple variables in the context of the South Asian case, particularly the India Pakistan relations. In the next section, the paper has devised a neoclassical realist framework to understand the strains on nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, focusing both on the domestic imperatives and evolving regional politics. Figure 1 will help to understand the framework of analysis to refl ect on the dynamics of deterrence between India and Pakistan.

In the next section, the above variables are examined to measure the level of deterrence exists between India and Pakistan.