GEOPOLITICAL TUSSLES ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA UNDER TRUMP 2.0: IS UNCERTAINTY THE ONLY CERTAINTY?

This paper examines how Donald Trump’s second presidency reshapes US foreign policy toward China and its implications for two critical flashpoints—the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Trump 2.0 signals a departure from traditional bipartisan consensus, favouring a transactional “America First” approach marked by deviation in US commitment towards its allies and prioritising homeland protection. These dynamics create incoherence in US policy, opening both opportunities and constraints for China’s regional manoeuvring. The study highlights how Taiwan faces growing pressure to bolster its defence capabilities and civil resilience, while the South China Sea witnesses intensified clashes, particularly between China and the Philippines, in the absence of a consistent US posture. Drawing on qualitative analysis, key informant interviews, and extensive secondary sources, the paper argues that Trump 2.0 introduces new uncertainties in Sino–US security relations. It concludes that understanding these shifts is essential to anticipate future trajectories of competition, cooperation, or conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

Donald Trump, within only a few months of his arrival at the Oval Office for

the second term of the US presidency, has seemingly made quite dramatic changes that

are redrawing the contours of the post-World War II order based on America’s alliance

pattern and leading key international institutions. The biggest change can be marked in

the transatlantic relations and how the European allies perceived the burden-sharing of

European security. America under Trump seems principally to be concerned with its own

borders and the Western hemisphere. However, Trump 2.0 does not imply a withdrawal

from the Indo-Pacific region; rather, it implies a different modality of foreign policy, mostly

inferring a transactional approach by putting ‘America First’ above everything else.

From the US perspective, the Sino-US strategic competition often lies

in the narratives of perceiving China as the most pressing geopolitical challenge

to the US. And the Chinese strategic narrative often portrays constraints the US

puts on the transformation of the former into a global power, implying fairness in

the Asia Pacific region.1 China sees its rise as a positive influence to democratise

the international relations dominated by the hegemonic rules of Western nations.2

These competing views are often manifested in two geopolitical flashpoints – the Taiwan

Strait and the South China Sea. These two tipping points bear the strategic significance of

being theatres for great power competition with the potential of escalating into a military

conflict.3

The Taiwan Strait serves as a vital maritime corridor not only for China

and Taiwan but also for international trade, as nearly all major container vessels

navigate through this channel. To its north lies the Miyako Strait, positioned between

Taiwan and the Japanese islands, while to the south stretches the Bashi Strait, linking

Taiwan and the Philippines. For Beijing, these waterways flanking Taiwan act as

crucial passageways to the wider Pacific. Geographically, Taiwan sits at the centre of

China’s eastern coastline, separated from the mainland by just about 130 kilometres

(km.). China sees Taiwan as an inseparable part of its territory and is committed to

the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. The United States (US) has had a

somewhat ambiguous policy, but it has projected its interests in protecting the island

from any Chinese advancement. The US has some of its key bases in South Korea,

Japan, and the Philippines. If the dots are connected, the US bases form a chain.

Taiwan sits at the heart of what is called in the US the ‘first island chain’ against

Chinese military installations in the region.

Bordering several East and Southeast Asian countries, the South China Sea

represents a strategic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), carrying US$ 3 trillion

worth of goods, on which many regional and extra-regional powers depend on a large

scale.4 The water body is also home to untapped natural gas and oil deposits under the

seabed, a thriving fish stock accounting for more than 12 per cent of global fish catch,5

over 200 bodies of land in the shape of islands, islets, and rock features, giving

strategic depth. China’s territorial claims covering both land features and the

surrounding waters have sparked strong opposition from rival claimants such as

Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. China claims

the largest share of the area, marked by its so-called “nine-dash line,” a boundary

made up of nine marks stretching hundreds of miles south and east from Hainan, its southernmost province.6 The hotly contested water body has been experiencing an

alarming rise in clashes between China and the Philippines in 2025.

The geopolitical dynamics of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea

cannot be viewed in isolation, as they are intertwined in many ways. The newer

dynamics introduced by Trump 2.0 have further implications for these geopolitical

hotspots in the Indo-Pacific region. Nevertheless, the extent of deviation and changes

in US policies towards Sino-US security dynamics needs a deeper understanding and

rigorous research. This paper is designed to fill that contemporary research gap and

will link the findings with the future trajectory of geopolitical tussles across the

Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Therefore, it asks two fundamental questions:

How will US foreign policy orientation toward Sino-US security dynamics evolve

under Trump 2.0? How does Trump 2.0 reshape the geopolitical tussles across the

Taiwan Strait and South China Sea? The paper argues that Trump 2.0 provides

different dynamics in Sino-US relations, leading to an incoherent US policy

towards China. It analyses the diverging voices inside the Trump administration

that shape and are influenced by the President’s transactional diplomacy, putting

‘America First’ above everything else. This will provide China with some strategic

opportunities and challenges in pursuing its interests across the Taiwan Strait and

the South China Sea. As a consequence, the paper analyses that the South China

Sea will experience more clashes and skirmishes in the absence of a coherent US

policy against Chinese interests in the region. Moreover, Taiwan has to strengthen its

national defence capability and indigenous defence industry, while focusing on civil

defence resilience in the face of an asymmetric conflict. The changes in the domestic

political dynamics in Taiwan are important to understand its future, and China will

intensify its manoeuvring to reshape these domestic dynamics of Taiwan to further

its agenda of reunification.

This paper follows a qualitative methodology, built on an interpretive

research approach. Data were gathered through two main sources: Key Informant

Interviews (KIIs) and an extensive review of secondary literature. For the primary

data, semi-structured interviews were conducted with carefully chosen informants

who possess deep expertise and practical experiences in areas such as geopolitics

in the Indo-Pacific region, Sino-US relations, Taiwan, and Southeast and East Asian

affairs. The participants were selected purposively to ensure they brought informed

expert opinion to the discussion. The semi-structured format allowed conversations

to flow openly while keeping the core themes of the study in focus, resulting in

detailed and insightful responses. On the secondary sources, the study engaged with

a wide range of sources, including books, journal articles, dissertations, monographs,opinion pieces, and media reports. Both regional outlets—such as those from China,

Taiwan, and the Philippines—and international sources were consulted. By weaving

together insights from interviews with diverse written materials, the paper builds a

richer and more nuanced understanding of the security challenges in the region.

This paper is divided into seven sections. After the introduction, it explains

the analytical framework used to explain the future trajectory of geopolitical tussles

across the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea during Trump 2.0. The third section

analyses the foreign policy formulation of Trump 2.0 and how it shapes the US policy

towards Sino-US strategic competition. The fourth and fifth sections respectively

deal with the impact of Trump 2.0 on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Each section

also provides an analysis of how China will react to the uncertainties of Trump 2.0.

The sixth section provides a sketch of how the regional security dynamics will be

shaped by these changing realities of US policy towards China and the Indo-Pacific

region. The paper concludes with some future research directions on this subject

matter.

This paper examines the likely unfolding of the Trump administration’s

foreign policy towards China, and therefore, its primary analytical component is the

foreign policy dynamics of Trump 2.0. It then links this with the US policy dynamics

on the Taiwan issue and the disputes in the South China Sea. Therefore, one of the

primary features of this analytical framework is to provide plausible scenarios to

analyse the impact of Trump 2.0 on the dynamics of two geopolitical flashpoints in

the Indo-Pacific region 

This framework maps how Trump 2.0’s foreign policy orientation feeds into

broader US–China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (see Figure 1). At the starting point,

Trump 2.0’s foreign policy orientation is shaped by deviation in US commitment

towards its allies and prioritising homeland protection, occasionally recalibrated

by the broader dynamics of Indo-Pacific competition. At its core, the framework

highlights Sino-US security dynamics, which play out in two critical flashpoints—

the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. These tensions can evolve into different

outcomes: a best-case scenario where confrontation is prevented, leading to successful

negotiations; a default scenario of sustained rivalry with limited escalation; or a

worst-case scenario of military conflict. In short, the framework shows how US

policy choices under Trump 2.0 could shape the trajectory of regional stability

through different pathways of competition and conflict with China. It also underlines

that the Indo-Pacific remains the central arena where power politics and strategic

competition unfold. It highlights that policy interaction between Washington and

Beijing will directly influence peace, stability, or crisis in the region.

The arrival of Donald Trump at the White House for the second time has

already provided a major platform for some notable shifts in US foreign policy.

However, while Trump might sound more confrontational in his speeches, it does not

provide conclusive evidence that US foreign policy follows the same provocative

line. The strategic disengagement by putting “America First” and a transactional

style has the potential of de-escalating some of the geopolitical flashpoints. On the

question of China, Trump is surrounded by people with contrasting views on US

foreign policies and Sino-US relations. There are people who are aligned with a

hawkish view that China presents the most pressing threat to the national security

of the USA. On the other hand, there are dominating views on the significance

of securing the homeland first, aligning with the essence of the ‘America First’

principle. This debate is also reflected in the development of the National Defence

Strategy (NDS) of Trump 2.0, the draft of which is reported to be more concerned

with the protection of the homeland and the Western hemisphere.8 According to those

reports, the NDS will prioritise domestic and regional priorities over countering

foreign adversaries like China and Russia. However, it is in the drafting phase, and

the Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, who holds a hawkish view about China and

has highlighted the significance of the threat posed by China to the US vision in the

Indo-Pacific, will have his option to insert his views after reviewing. Undersecretary

of Defence for Policy Elbridge Colby had the primary responsibility of drafting

the NDS, who is often labelled as ‘Asia-firsters’ and known for advocating for a

defence strategy focusing on deterring China.9 However, during his confirmation

hearing, he labelled the Taiwan issue as important, but not an existential threat to the

US.10 Colby’s views are aligned with those of Vice President Vance, who personally

endorsed the former’s candidacy for the position in the administration. Apart from

personal attachment, Colby’s prioritising approach is aligned with the cohort led

by the Vice President, who advocates for American disengagement from military

conflicts around the globe. The initial draft of NDS 2025 marks a resemblance to the

Vice President’s speeches in different forums, like the Munich Security Conference, where he outlined the significance of the biggest threat coming from the retreat of

Europe from conservative or traditional values rather than from any external actor

like China and Russia.11 This approach is often known as ‘come home, America’

views to which Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard subscribes, along

with the Vice President. In contrast to this, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and

former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz advocated for aggressive containment

and a reinvigorated Monroe Doctrine to combat Chinese influence.12 However,

Marco Rubio’s stance on many things, like Putin’s role in the Russia-Ukraine War,

has dramatically changed during his tenure under Trump 2.0.

These differences in foreign policy views get reshaped and revised by what

President Trump expresses on social media and through traditional media outlets.

While the key personnel of the Trump administration differ on US foreign policy, they

rarely contradict the President’s views. They do lobby their views to be dominant in the

administration, but the dynamics seem to be incoherent and inconsistent. In addition to

the differences in ideologues, the competing forces between institutionalists and antiinstitutionalists

who prioritise populist sentiments shape the trajectory of US foreign

policy. It is also applicable in the case of Sino-US relations, where the most likely

outcome would be a political stalemate in deciding US policy.13 On the economic

front, Trump’s policies resemble attempts to bring production jobs back to the US and

generate revenues to cover tax cuts. On the security issue, Trump wants to redesign

American defence policy by focusing more on the burden-sharing from the allies and

overhauling US military readiness to showcase ‘peace through strength’. In the case

of US policies on Sino-US security issues under Trump 2.0, there are both continuities

and diversions from Trump 1.0. During his first term at the Oval Office, there were

high-level reciprocal visits between the two countries in the first year. However, from

2018, a series of events deteriorated the bilateral relations – trade war, sanctions on

Huawei, diplomatic row over protests in Hong Kong. In the last year of Trump 1.0,

the global pandemic saw the near-total breakdown in Sino-US relations. During his

successive administration’s tenure, the strategic competition continued in different

modalities. The Biden administration followed a strategy of outcompeting China as

articulated in the 2022 National Security Strategy and as demonstrated by controlling

the transfer of high technology to China.14 This strategy, nonetheless, put the strategic

competition with China in the first place while apprising the security environment.15 In contrast to Trump 1.0 and the preceding Biden administration, Trump

2.0 so far symbolises an incoherent strategy, despite adopting a more rhetorical and

transactional approach. Unlike Biden, who sought to counterbalance China through

close coordination with allies and a long-term strategy of managed competition,

Trump’s second term points to a more unilateral and deal-driven approach, with an

emphasis on securing quick economic advantages.16 As mentioned earlier, Trump’s

aides also represent diverging ideas and political objectives. The battles among these

factions will significantly shape how the US policy towards China on security issues

will evolve. How this will evolve and impact the trajectory of US-China relations

in the long run remains to be seen. However, it will present both opportunities and

challenges for China. The worst-case scenario in the bilateral relations will be military

escalation, in the form of a naval blockade, or direct military conflicts, where the

Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea will be the geopolitical flashpoints. However,

this scenario is unlikely due to the presence of strong restraining voices in the Trump

administration and its disengaging trend from military conflicts. Nevertheless, this

scenario gets support from perspectives of some of the former officials of the Trump

administration, which put the president in the spotlight as a political figure with an

impulsive temperament and diplomatic brinksmanship. One such account was the

recollection of General Mark Milley, the head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff during

Trump 1.0, portrayed in the book by Bob Woodward and Robert Costa. In this book,

General Milley shared his experience of calling his Chinese counterpart General Li

Zuocheng, bypassing all protocols, on October 30, 2020, in fear that Trump might go

rogue by starting a nuclear war with China in his final days.17

The most optimistic pathway for bilateral relations in Trump’s second

presidency is also highly unlikely–economic and technological cooperation, deescalation

of tension, and potential breakthrough over Taiwan. This possibility is

supported by Trump’s style of leadership, as he, unlike a Democratic leader, does

not come with the baggage of rhetoric on human rights and democratic values. These

rhetorics often put the first barrier in terms of dealing with a foreign counterpart

with a different governance system. Due to this trait and his transactional diplomacy,

Beijing would prefer him to dealing with Biden. While Trump might be the most

suited for reaching a deal over Taiwan, as he boasts of his credentials of being a

dealmaker,18 it is still unlikely that such a groundbreaking diplomatic feat will be

achieved. The current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration in Taiwan is unwilling to sit at the negotiation table with China on its reunification with the latter

and is adopting critical views of mainland China and the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP). The best-case scenario here might be a negotiation brokered by President

Trump, but any possibility of change in the status quo of Taiwan will face vehement

opposition from American domestic politics and the European allies. The possibility

of reaching a deal over the disputes in the South China Sea is also unlikely, as the

competing claims of the regional countries are directly linked with their territorial

integrity.

In contrast to the two scenarios, the most likely scenario will put the US in

a seemingly ‘disengaged’ position, focusing more on domestic issues. This might

result in frequent clashes in the South China Sea between China and countries

with competing claims, especially the Philippines. In this scenario, the partners of

the US in this region, like Australia, South Korea, and Japan, will try to ensure

American presence here. These countries would not desire a direct confrontation

between the US and China, but they would not want American absence from

this strategic theatre either.19 In terms of dealing with Taiwan, Trump has been

consistent in not making an exception by keeping the US ally out of his transactional

policy. Therefore, the US strategic ambiguity over the Taiwan question will likely

remain, with a focus on developing its defence capabilities through a transactional

approach rather than providing a security net. In this scenario, the stability in

this region will also depend on how China pursues its interests in the Taiwan

Strait and the South China Sea. Trump’s transactional diplomacy and unilateral

approach provide opportunities for Beijing to manoeuvre its strategic strength.

However, it is highly unlikely that Chinese activities will produce any worstcase

scenario alone, as the country is also focusing on becoming a great modern

socialist country in all respects, achieving the ‘national rejuvenation’ by 2049.20

Military conflict apparently does not provide any positive aspect in this regard.21

China will continue expanding and modernising its People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) and justify the motive to ensure peace and stability in the region. On the

other hand, this will be perceived by the hawks in the US political domain as an

aggressive move and an existential threat to the US interest in the region, and will

prompt Trump to adopt policies of active engagement against China. It will be a

short-sighted perception to identify Trump as an isolationist; rather, he should be viewed as someone who prefers minimal engagement on the global stage instead of

complete withdrawal, which will provide a window to focus more on issues to take

things which are deemed ‘stolen’ by the world, back to the US.22

Figure 2: Plausible Trajectory of Geopolitical Tussles in Taiwan Strait and South

China Sea during Trump 2.023 

The vocal support for Taiwan showcased during Trump 1.0 was not followed

by the same zeal during his re-election campaign in 2024. It, in fact, cast doubt over

the future trajectory of US support for Taiwan. Following his trademark of telling

US partners to invest more in their own national defence budget, Trump also put

Taiwan in the spotlight by asking them to pay the US for defence.24 In an interview

with Bloomberg, he flagged the idea of conceiving the US as not different than an insurance company to which ‘wealthy countries’ like Taiwan should pay for their

defence against Chinese advancement.25 However, the doubts tended to get mitigated

with the nomination of Senator Marco Rubio as Trump’s pick for the Secretary of

State, a well-known pro-Taiwan political figure26 and a staunch opposing voice

against China.27 The possibility of an evasive US stance on Taiwan under Trump

2.0 got overshadowed by the progression of the Trump Administration’s further

activities. Notable parameters can be drawn from the remarks delivered at different

international forums by Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth. Secretary Hegseth

sought to establish the premise of US assurance during his Asia tour28 and at the

Shangri-La Dialogue, where he vowed to counter Chinese aggression in the region

with special focus on Taiwan.29

While there are reassuring elements in the remarks of key figures of the

Trump Administration, there are also elements of the possibility of US policy shifting

towards identifying the Taiwan issue as a ‘distant concern’ at the time of a crisis.30

The Biden administration showed some progression from ‘strategic ambiguity’

to ‘strategic clarity’ over the question of the US commitment to defend Taiwan.31

Taiwan has historically remained rooted in ambiguity in US policy—officially

endorsing only one China, but through the Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances,

and subsequent legislation, the US committed to Taiwan’s protection and enhanced

ties.32 Over time, this has evolved into increasingly robust economic, diplomatic,

and security engagement—especially amid rising cross-strait tensions. Trump 2.0

has been termed as signalling a shift from ‘strategic ambiguity’ to ‘strategic anxiety’

on the question of US support for Taiwan.33 This has resulted in some implications

for Taiwan to readdress its relation with the US along with the following dynamics:

maintaining favourable relations with the current US administration, avoiding disruptions in bilateral trade and security assistance. The impact of the Trump

administration’s signature moves to encourage its allies to spend more on their

national defence can also be detected in the case of Taiwan; however, it will take

time to realise any major shift in Taiwan’s defence spending. Taiwan still spends a

mere 2.45 per cent of its GDP on defence, while US Under Secretary of Defence for

Policy Elbridge Colby opined during his confirmation hearing that the country should

elevate its spending to around 10 per cent.34 Although Taiwanese president Lai Chingte

pledged to elevate it to 3 per cent by this year, there are still considerable doubts in

this regard.35 Comparing with other regional and extra-regional countries, Taiwan’s

defence budget is already larger as a share of its total governmental expenditure.

At the domestic front, the Taiwanese government is also focusing on a

‘whole-of-society’ approach under the leadership of President Lai Ching-te.37 Taking

the possibility of a protracted conflict and the asymmetry of Taiwan’s capability into

consideration, the ‘Overall Defence Concept’ (ODC) was conceived during Tsai Ingwen’s

presidency.38 The current administration has elevated the significance of civil resilience at the time of a crisis, as President Lai Ching-te assumed the leadership

of the ‘Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Committee’ within a month of coming

to power.39 The initiative is backed by financial support of around US$ 5 billion

for developing national resilience and territorial defence capabilities.40 It focuses

on five key areas of national defence capabilities of Taiwan: civilian training and

deployment; management of strategic resources and supply chains; maintenance of

energy and key infrastructure; readiness of social services, healthcare, and evacuation

systems; and protection of information, transport, and financial networks.41 The

approach is also reshaping Taiwan’s military doctrines and exercises, simulating the

readiness of civil defence in urban warfare during its annual Han Kuang military

exercise.42 While this approach is ‘securitising’ civilian involvement in a protracted

and asymmetric conflict, the government has to address the critical issues in the

traditional domain of national security. Taiwan’s energy security is highly vulnerable

at the time of a crisis, as 96 per cent of its energy supply is imported, making it

vulnerable to a potential naval blockade or maritime traffic disruption.43 Taiwan also

has to counter what it calls ‘grey zone harassment’ by China, including the cutting

of underwater communication cables vital for the national telecommunications

system.44 One of the other issues in the allegation of ‘grey zone harassment’ is in

the cyber domain. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau encountered an average of 2.4

million cyberattacks per day in 2024, most of which are claimed to have originated

from Chinese cyber forces, in which Beijing had routinely denied any involvement.45

The allegations are directed towards the objective of undermining the Taiwanese

government by spreading misinformation and collecting intelligence about critical

infrastructure.46 Beijing has also accused the Taiwanese government of orchestrating

cyberattacks against a tech company in Guangzhou.47 It has been alleged that the government-backed hacker group was behind targeting 1000 sensitive targets,

including military, energy, and government installations, in which the Taiwanese

government also denied any involvement.48 Taiwan is also dealing with a growing

number of espionage cases, recording sixty six cases in the last year, two-thirds of

which involve its own military officials.49

The Trump administration’s tariff policy is also affecting the US-Taiwan

relations and the notion of security guarantees. Taiwan was initially faced with the

announcement of a 32 per cent of reciprocal tariff on its exported goods to the US,

but it was reduced to 20 per cent later and negotiations are ongoing to lower it

further.50 One of the most critical industries of Taiwan is its semiconductor industry,

hosting the global giant in this sector, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing

Company (TSMC). Trump threatened to impose a 100 per cent tariff on foreign

semiconductors in order to bring the supply chain of electronics back to the US.51

However, like other industries, if the companies pledged to invest in the US, then

they would be exempted from these high tariffs. Taiwan has already been taking

initiatives to avoid any drastic impacts on its strategic lifeline. TSMC has started

making advanced chips in its facilities in Arizona earlier this year. They are at the

forefront of surging outward direct investment from Taiwan to the US. The company

also declared plans to invest an additional amount of US$ 100 billion in the US on

top of the previously announced US$ 65 billion worth of investment.52 The demand

for more investment and production of cutting-edge semiconductor chips in the US

is at an all-time high, but the public opinion and political opposition in Taiwan might

suggest otherwise.53 The transfer of its semiconductor industry to the US has also led

to concerns about the diminishing value of its ‘silicon shield’ against any potential

Chinese advancement.54 This has also led to the growing cases of US scepticism in Taiwan, contrary to the rising support for Trump 1.0 policies towards Taiwan.55

There are other caveats, like the fate of continued US financial support for TSMC

through the Biden Administration’s CHIPS and Science Act, which was repeatedly

criticised by President Trump. 

One of the corollary consequences of the Trump administration’s pressure on

increasing national defence expenditures is concluding arms procurement deals with

the US. The Lai Ching-te government is also eying a potential arms deal to avoid

any strategic shift in the Taiwan policy of the US. It was reported that negotiations

were ongoing for concluding an arms deal worth of around US$ 7 – US$ 10 billion.57

The deal would include a coastal defence rocket system and High Mobility Artillery

Rocket System (HIMARS). This deal would also imply sending a strategic signal

to the US that Taiwan is committed to the national defence of its own and would

seek US security assistance and cooperation in the future. However, the current DPP

government is facing domestic obstacles from opposition in the parliament, calling

for cuts in government spending.58 This led to the mass-scale ‘recall campaign’

urging to hold elections to oust those MPs from the parliament.59 While it failed to do so, the resistance against increased government expenditure will have a far-reaching

impact on the national defence capabilities of Taiwan.

4.1 Chinese Priorities on the Taiwan Question during Trump 2.0

China regards Taiwan as its inseparable part and has repeatedly called for

its peaceful reunification with the mainland.60 The process of peaceful reunification

is somewhat not crystal clear, and it begets different interpretations. One plausible

outlook is the implementation of ‘one country, two systems’, implying the concept

of power-sharing. While this is being applied to the cases of Hong Kong and Macao

as Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of China, it was originally developed

for Taiwan and originated from the thoughts of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou

Enlai. Chairman Mao implied that, with the exception of foreign affairs, the Taiwan

authorities can exercise military and political power after the peaceful reunification.61

The concept of ‘one country, two systems’ was advanced by Deng Xiaoping, and

subsequent leaders later operationalised it. There is growing distrust among Western

countries and Taiwan over the differences between what China promised to Hong

Kong and what it is providing.62 The growing concern about Hong Kong’s political

freedom is often used as a vanguard by the West against the idea of reunification

of Taiwan with mainland China. However, in the case of Taiwan, there has to be

negotiation first between the Chinese and the Taiwanese government, the possibility

of which is getting bleaker day by day.63 China perceives the rhetoric of Taiwanese

President Lai Ching-te as a provocative stumbling block for any negotiation.64 China

perceives the US trend as a deviation from its ‘One China Policy’, starting from

the coming of Tsai Ing-wen to the power in Taiwan in 2016, since her anti-China

rhetorics were not met with any rebuttals from the US.65 This US diplomatic posture

can be seen as its deliberate attempt to balance between the ‘One China Policy’ and

Taiwan’s distinctiveness from the PRC, but it has added more ambiguities to its

policy towards Taiwan.Trump 2.0 provides an opportunity for China to manoeuvre its diplomatic

and strategic leverage on the question of Taiwan. It will continue isolating Taiwan

on the diplomatic front as the latter has lost recognition from ten countries since

2016, leaving it with only twelve official diplomatic partners.66 China might pursue

the anti-Lai faction inside the Trump administration, who are publicly pro-Taiwan,67

for undoing the deviation of the ‘One China Policy’ and demand ‘reassurance’

regarding the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.68 Contrary to the popular Taiwanese

and American rhetoric regarding the 2027 timeline of reunification, Beijing might

be at an early stage of building momentum towards complete reunification. One top

Chinese expert put the estimate of peaceful reunification somewhere between five to

ten years, but there will always be concern about any dramatic escalation.69 While

there are advantages of having a set timeline, there are also drawbacks, as some of the

crucial elements are beyond China’s control. In order to build momentum, one of the

cornerstones of the Chinese approach will be shaping a favourable domestic political

dynamic of Taiwan, mainly through the Kuomintang (KMT) party and activities to

undermine the DPP agenda, which might be intensified during Trump 2.0.70 

The US commitment towards its allies who have competing claims against

China in the South China Sea was not particularly tested during Trump 1.0.71

However, Trump 2.0 is already marked with frequent clashes in this hotly contested

water body, where Sino-Filipino tussles have been the most highlighted ones, as

shown in Annex 1. The Philippines has sought to publicise brinksmanship against

Chinese activities, which is largely attributed to the leadership of President Ferdinand

Marcos Jr., who departed from his predecessor’s alleged conciliatory stance towards

China.72 The dynamics of the US-Philippines relations are important to understand

and predict the future trajectory of the latter’s skirmishes and clashes with China.The Biden administration publicly acknowledged the US commitment to protect

the Philippines in the case of an attack on the latter’s armed forces, aircraft, and

public vessels, including those of its Coast Guard, under Article IV of the 1951 USPhilippines

Mutual Defence Treaty.73

While there can be substantial room for doubting the US commitment

during Trump 2.0, President Marcos is actively pursuing the matter with his US

counterpart, yielding some success. Following his visit to the White House in July,

a flurry of defence diplomatic activities occurred between the two countries.74 The

Chief of Staff of the Philippines’ Armed Forces met the US Indo-Pacific Commander

(USINDOPACOM) and signed a symbolic yet significant memorandum to

augment coordination between the two nations’ armed forces.75 The two countries

are also negotiating to deploy more US missile systems,76 in addition to the already

installed Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile

launchers by the US in Batan Island near the key hotspot Bashi Strait off the coast

of Taiwan.77 There are also plans to strengthen the Philippines’ indigenous defence

industry through collaboration between US giant Lockheed Martin and Southern

Methodist University (SMU) of the Philippines to enhance the latter’s R&D

capacity.78 These developments also drove momentum in the US showcasing of its

forces in the South China Sea. USS Higgins and USS Cincinnati – two US Navy

destroyers were deployed on the hotly contested water of Scarborough Shoal.79

While China claimed to drive these two warships away,80 it faced public exposure after the video of two of its vessels collision while chasing the Philippines’ coast

guard vessels went viral.81

The nine-dash line of China puts almost the entire South China Sea under

the claims of China, clashing with the EEZs of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Vietnam, and Brunei. While the Chinese skirmishes with the Philippines will likely

be the highlight of the tussles in the South China Sea under Trump 2.0, other key US

allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia will make repeated diplomatic calls to

ensure US presence in the South China Sea. The US is likely continuing to exercise

‘innocent passage’ rights, though on an ad-hoc basis, responding to the calls of its

allies in the region.82 In the absence of regular US freedom of navigation operations

(FONOP), regional players like Australia might exercise their claimed right and

encounter Chinese obstruction.83

5.1 Chinese Strategic Posture in the South China Sea during Trump 2.0

The South China Sea is not only a strategic maritime route for

China; it is a geostrategic water body crucial for the PLA Navy to project

power against the US and its allies’ ‘first island chain’. Therefore, China

will continue building ports, airstrips, and military installations in the

islands, both natural and artificially created, of the South China Sea in the

coming days. The militarisation of islands is reported on the basis of satellite

images, where China is claimed to have twenty outposts in the Paracel and

seven in the Spratly islands.84 Therefore, China will continue to drive away

any incursion into its claimed territory by using force, and the trend is likely

to be prominent in the absence of a coherent South China Sea policy under

Trump 2.0.85 Chinese activities will test the brinksmanship of the Ferdinand

government in the Philippines, which the former identifies as anti-China and

provocative.86 China has already declared plans to establish a national reserve in the contested Scarborough Shoal, to which entries of foreign vessels will be

highly controlled.87

The Taiwan issue and disputes in the South China Sea cannot be seen in

isolation. China perceives the strategic importance of the South China Sea not only

to assert control over maritime routes but also as a forward platform to counter the

US and its allies, supporting its broader goal of eventual unification with Taiwan.

China’s militarisation of the South China Sea is a deliberate strategy to strengthen

its position in any potential Taiwan scenario. By fortifying islands and reefs with

airstrips, missile systems, and surveillance infrastructure, Beijing secures key

maritime chokepoints and expands its operational reach toward the First Island

Chain. This gives China strategic depth, enabling it to monitor and potentially

interdict movements of US and allied forces that might come to Taiwan’s defence.

The deviation, changes, and incoherence in the US policy regarding Taiwan

and South China Sea disputes will have major implications for the countries in the

region, especially the US allies. Complying with Trump’s transactional foreign

policy, key US allies in the region, including Taiwan, will increase their arms

procurement from the US, and it will contribute to the militarisation of one of

the heavily militarised regions in the world. Japan’s pacifist principle will be

tested during Trump 2.0, as it has already shown signs of deviation by relaxing

domestic constraints on exporting arms.88 It is exploring ways to strengthen the

maritime capabilities of one of the key nations against Chinese advancement in

the South China Sea – the Philippines. It has already started negotiations to export

frigates and early-warning radar systems to the Philippines, which will contribute

to the latter’s maritime combat strength in the face of the PLA Navy.89 Japan is

also involved in stepping up trilateral exercises with the US and the Philippines,

especially among their Coast Guards, to enhance the latter’s ability to tackle grey

zone activities.90

South Korea is another regional player contributing to the modernising defence

capabilities of US allies like the Philippines in the face of Chinese escalations. South

Korea has already established itself as a reliable partner in building some of the core

military capabilities of the Philippines. On top of that, the Philippines is eying joint

defence equipment production with South Korea in the near future.91 While these

two countries’ defence convergence goes way back to the time of the Korean War,

Trump 2.0 is pushing countries like the Philippines to forge close security ties with

Japan, overshadowing its uncomfortable history of being militarily subjugated.92

Australia is another key regional player engaged in upgrading the existing defence

agreement, projected to be completed by 2026.93 It is also involved in holding drills

with the Philippines, the most recent one being the ‘Exercise Alon’ with the Royal

Canadian Navy and the US Marine Corps in the South China Sea.94 India held its

first naval exercise with the Philippines in the South China Sea this year, which

was followed by the announcement of initiating a ‘strategic partnership’.95 However,

India’s commitment to fighting Chinese interests in the South China Sea remains

untested as the country is venturing through its claimed ‘strategic autonomy’ in its

relations with the US, Russia, and China. These new dynamics will test the efficacy

of some of the key minilaterals like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in

deterring Chinese interests in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. While the

Trump administration will not leave these minilaterals, their efficacy as a joint voice

against Chinese interests in the region might decay in the absence of a proactive

US leadership. The countries are aware of the notion that American protection will

come at a cost, and therefore, bilateral relations with the US and other regional US

allies will take centre stage in the coming days to deter Chinese interests. It is a

distant possibility, but there might be another minilateral including Japan, South

Korea, the Philippines, and Australia at the risk of antagonising China and escalating

the regional dynamics further. However, the US allies will primarily explore every

option to ensure American presence in the region and bolster their own defence

capabilities. 

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has once again unsettled

the foundations of US foreign policy, particularly in its approach toward China

and the Indo-Pacific. This paper has shown that Trump 2.0 represents not a full

withdrawal from the region, but rather a transactional and often incoherent approach

that leaves allies uncertain and adversaries opportunistic. Taiwan and the South

China Sea remain the two most consequential theatres where this ambiguity plays

out. For Taiwan, US support oscillates between reassurance and strategic anxiety,

compelling the island to strengthen its own defence capabilities and civil resilience.

In the South China Sea, the lack of a consistent US strategy is already emboldening

China while forcing regional allies, especially the Philippines, to test the limits of

American commitments.

Taken together, these developments suggest a regional environment where

the risk of clashes and escalation remains high, but where deliberate restraint and

opportunistic manoeuvring by both Washington and Beijing will continue to shape

the outcomes. The Indo-Pacific is therefore entering a period of fragile stability,

one where uncertainty itself is the defining certainty. Future research should further

examine three areas: first, the evolving domestic debates in Washington that pit

“China hawks” against “America First” advocates, and how these affect long-term

US credibility in Asia; second, the resilience strategies of middle powers like Japan,

South Korea, and Australia in filling gaps left by an inconsistent US; and third,

China’s plausible avenues of power projection in the coming days. By exploring

these dynamics in depth, analysts and policymakers can better anticipate whether

Trump 2.0 will merely unsettle the Indo-Pacific balance or fundamentally reshape it

for years to come.